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It was only a small nuke. I’m sorry too, Dimitri.
Posted by on Monday, October 9, 2006 at 11:26 am

In contrast to earlier reports that North Korea planned to test a nuke with a yield greater than that of the Hiroshima bomb (~13 kilotons) and similar to that of the Nagasaki bomb (~21 kilotons), it appears that last night’s test had a yield of less than a kiloton:

North Korea’s nuclear test was low-powered and is believed to have been conducted in a horizontal tunnel dug deep inside a mountain on its northeast coast.

The activity measured 3.6 on the Richter scale, which could be caused by the explosion of the equivalent of 800 tonnes of dynamite, said Chi Heon-Cheol, head of the Korea Earthquake Research Centre.

Another unidentified expert quoted by Yonhap news agency said the blast was equivalent to about 550 tonnes of TNT judging by the seismic tremor.

The US atomic bomb which destroyed Hiroshima during World War II was comparable to 12,500 tons of TNT.

This may have been what the Bush Administration official who said the North Koreans “may not have gotten what they wanted” was referring to. In comments, Aaron says:

It’s (relatively) easy to bring together a critical mass of uranium or plutonium and start a nuclear reaction. When this happens, a nuclear explosion has occurred. It’s somewhat harder to keep the nuclear fuel together long enough to explode all of it. If the bomb is poorly designed or built, it’s possible for the bulk of the fuel to be blown clear before undergoing fission. So a bomb designed for 20 kT can end up at 1 kT.

So this test may have been somewhat less than fully “successful”… not that Kim Taepodong Il’s government will ever admit that.

That said, I wouldn’t particularly want a even a 0.55-kiloton or 0.8-kiloton nuclear explosion happening in an American city. (On the other hand, if this nuke was basically a dud, would a terrorist buy it — or, rather, another one just like it — knowing it’ll probably underperform expectations?)

Also, they may test another one.

P.S. More info on Richter scale/kiloton equivalents from Wikipedia.

P.P.S.

UPDATE: Continuing on the Dr. Strangelove theme, InstaPundit links to this Kim Jong Il photoshop:

On a more serious note, the Russians say it was more like 5 to 15 kilotons, not 550 to 800 tons. But that seems implausible, given the seismic readings. DefenseTech explains:

[A seismic reading in the range of] 3.58-3.7 gives you a couple hundred tons (not kilotons) … The same equation, given the US estimate of 4.2, yields…around a kiloton.

A plutonium device should produce a yield in the range of the 20 kilotons, like the one we dropped on Nagasaki. No one has ever dudded their first test of a simple fission device. North Korean nuclear scientists are now officially the worst ever.

Of course, I want to see what the US IC says. If/when the test vents, we could have some radionuclide data — maybe in the next 72 hours or so.

But, from the initial data, I’d say someone with no workable nuclear weapons (Kim Jong Il, I am looking at you) should be crapping his pants right now.

First the missile, then the bomb. Got anything else you wanna try out there, chief?

The post begins with the words, “HA HA HA HA,” and includes the following image:

Heh.

(Hat tip: Insty, again.)

UPDATE 2: Yet again via the Professor, here’s an alternative view. Donald Sensing says we shouldn’t be laughing:

I don’t mean to belabor the point I have made before, but I was trained in the Army as a nuclear-target analyst. A yield of 550-800 tons (.55-.8 KT) is not too small by any means as an achievable yield. … [A]n atomic bomb of .6KT or so is no city flattener, but would work quite spectacuarly as a terrorist weapon. If detonated on the ground or from the top of a building, it would also result in serious fallout, increasing the terror effect and the number of deaths. Further, it would contaminate the terrain at and near ground zero for a long time. Cleanup and decontamination would be lengthy and very expensive. Imagine such a weapon being detonated in an American harbor.

So we should not be relieved that the apparent yield was so low. If the design yield was in the sub-kilton range, then this test was very successful. …

For battlefield purposes, say, against the South Korean or US forces on the peninsula, a 1 KT device is more usable than a 20 KT bomb. A 1 KT weapon is smaller, thus easier to conceal, and can be designed to be fired from existing artillery pieces, whether cannons or rockets. A Nagasaki-yield weapon would be of little military utility in fighting against South Korea or American forces. And you much more easily can get from a tested 0.6-1.0 KT proof-of-concept device to a usable terror weapon of the same yield, than from a test of a much larger yielding device.

DefenseTech concludes the test was a “dud.� I think it’s far too soon to be laughing aloud at Kimmy boy, myself.


Well, at least we can still laugh at this:


source file

UPDATE 3: A second blast? At this point, only Drudge and the Australians are reporting this.




19 Comments on “It was only a small nuke. I’m sorry too, Dimitri.”

  1. Mad Max, Esquire Says:

    With no ability to deliver this weapon to a target and such a low-level yield, this “device” unfortunately has only one potential customer and use…

  2. Lojo Says:

    A Dr. Strangelove reference! I approve!

    “Gentlemen! You can’t fight in here, this is the War Room!!”

  3. Charles Says:

    One thing is for sure, this is Bush’s fault!

  4. Joe Mama Says:

    Heh, no sh*t Charles :-)

    Max sure is trying his hardest to peddle that line on another thread, but no one is buying it.

  5. Peter Evans Says:

    Can’t see terrorists asking for a refund. “What? What is this? The fireball’s barely a third of a kilometer wide! We’ve been gipped! Cancel the Pay-Pal account!”

    The chances of a North Korean nuke being detonated in an American city, or any city in the Western democracies, are zero. Kim Jong Il likes to act the big guy, but this isn’t ‘Team America’, any aggression by him will see the end of his country and his rule. This is just a prestige project and a deterrent - the worst that could happen (and there is a small chance here) is that he could use it on South Korea, which would be horrific in itself.

    There’s a good chance they might test another one. Personally, I’d feel concerned for Japan and South Korea, but there won’t be any clouds over US cities. Dictators don’t use WMD’s, it ruins their fun of oppressing their own people with impunity.

  6. Brendan Loy Says:

    Peter, I don’t understand your argument. There is “zero” chance of a North Korean nuke reaching U.S. shores because “any aggression by him will see the end of his country and his rule”… yet you acknowledge a “small chance” of him nuking South Korea, and you also feel “concerned” for Japan. How does your logic vis a vis nuking the U.S. (”any aggression by him will see the end of his country and his rule”) not ALSO apply to South Korea and Japan? Aren’t those countries our allies? Isn’t it equally obvious that if he nukes either of them, it would mean “the end of his country and his rule”?

    Now, I’m basing this purely off your stated rationale for concluding that the chance of a North Korean nuke going off in the U.S. is “zero.” There are other rationales that could be proposed, most notably that North Korea doesn’t have a delivery system for getting a nuke to the U.S., whereas he might have one for getting a nuke to Japan, and he certainly does for getting a nuke to Seoul. However, I was never proposing a direct strike, I was proposing using a sale to terrorists as a “delivery system.” Which, incidentally, might potentially alter the equation regarding “any aggression by him will see the end of his country and his rule.” If Kim could pass a nuke to terrorists and cover his tracks such that we don’t know it came from him, then it’s not so certain that we’d retaliate against him. Is it possible for his to cover his tracks that well? Maybe not, but the real question is, is it possible for him to believe that he can cover his tracks that well? If so, then I think the possibility is greater than “zero.”

  7. David K. Says:

    No Joe Mama, its the right wingers who aren’t buying it. This IS a failure of U.S. Foreign policy and as much blame as can be placed on any President (obviously there are limitations to what we can place blame for, this isn’t entirely his fault) it falls squarely on Bush’s shoulders because before he took office things vis a vis North Korea were stable in the nuclear sense. Inspectors were there, the reactors weren’t running.

  8. Lojo Says:

    David K. -

    I agree with your statement, (Yes it is a failure of US Foreign Policy), but its a policy failure stretching back to the Carter Administration in both lack of dealing with the situation and emphasis put on the good intentions of dictators.

    I say this with a complete lack of interest in either defending Bush or wanting to blame Clinton, yadda, yadda, yadda. I’d much rather hear how the situation is going to be resolved, because I don’t see any tidy answers or straightforward solutions. But, the time for hoping it will resolve itself has clearly passed.

  9. Joe Mama Says:

    “[A]s much as blame can be placed on any President (obviously there are limitations to what we can place blame for, this isn’t entirely his fault) it falls squarely on Bush’s shoulders because before he took office things vis a vis North Korea were stable in the nuclear sense. Inspectors were there, the reactors weren’t running.”

    David, as inspiring as your concession that “this isn’t entirely [Bush’s] fault” is, the causal relationship between Bush taking office and NKorea obtaining a nuclear weapon is incredibly specious. You’ve said exactly nothing about how Bush’s actions (or inactions) have brought about NKorea testing a nuke. Using your logic, one could just as well place the Red Sox’s World Series victory in 2004 squarely on the shoulders of Bush since before he took office, they hadn’t won in 86 years.

    Moreover, your statement that “[i]nspectors were there, the reactors weren’t running” before Bush took office is wrong as well as completely devoid of historical context: Amid fears that NKorea was developing nuclear pre-cursors by the early 90’s with their small nuclear reactor in Yongbyon, Clinton responded with military training exercises in SKorea which in turn prompted NKorea to threaten to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The fear that NKorea had nuclear capabilities grew in part because the current dictator’s father, Kim Il Sung, BLOCKED NUCLEAR INSPECTORS from the nuclear reactors they wanted to inspect, after which it was concluded by the IAEA that NKorea did indeed have nuclear capabilities. The Agreed Framework was signed in 1994 in which NKorea agreed to shutdown their old reactor and submit to inspections by the IAEA, and in return the U.S. would fund the construction of two “light water” reactors (which don’t produce as much plutonium as the older Yongbyon reactor, but which produce fissile material nonetheless).

  10. Joe Mama Says:

    And of course, NKorea was out of compliance with its int’l obligations in 1994 when the Agreed Framework was signed and remained out of compliance all the while thereafter, thus revealing that agreement to be little more than a cynical exercise in appeasement at worst, and a well-intentioned but failed diplomatic effort at best, that Bush inherited from the Clinton administration. I’m not saying that Bush did everything (or even most things) right with regard to NKorea, but to the extent that BDS crowd is trying to place this squarely on Bush’s shoulders, facts and history will intervene.

  11. Gen. Jack D. Ripper Says:

    First error - Drudge “reporting.”

    Second error - This happened on Bush’s watch. History will judge it as his failure. Just like LBJ is blamed for Vietnam even though Eisenhower, Kennedy, Nixon and Ford all dealt with Vietnam.

    Third error - N. Korean nuke posing “zero” threat to U.S. Even though it is highly improbable that this would happen, statisically speaking it is inaccurate to say that there is a “zero” chance of anything happening because there is always some chance of it occuring.

  12. David K. Says:

    Ok Jack, who’s failure is it? Under whose administration did North Korea resume its efforts to make a bomb? I’ll give you a hint, it starts with a “B” and ends with an “ush”

  13. Margiekins Says:

    Dr. Strangelove — one of my favorite movies of all time. You deviated prevert. :-)

    http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0057012/quotes

    –mek

  14. Joe Mama Says:

    “who’s failure is it? Under whose administration did North Korea resume its efforts to make a bomb? I’ll give you a hint, it starts with a ‘B’ and ends with an ‘ush’”

    That’s certainly the talking point du jour, and if one’s analysis goes no further I suppose that might make sense. But that strikes me as rather superficial thinking, David. NKorea may have agreed to halt its plutonium production program in 1994 as part of the Agreed Framework, but I don’t think too many serious observers ever believed NKorea actually lived up to its obligations in this regard. Moreover, although it’s too late for me to look up the facts right now, I seem to remember it coming out and being pretty well documented that Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan collaborated significantly with NKorea in the field of nuclear technology well before 9/11, i.e., before Bush took office. In any event, nuclear weapons programs are likely not the kind of endeavor that a gov’t just gives up completely and then resumes at a later time.

    If a country is determined to get the bomb, pretending that diplomacy can prevent it from doing so seems to me like nothing more than a pleasant fiction. I mean, are there any examples of a country as bellicose and intransigent as NKorea (or really ANY country for that matter) that seeks nuclear weapons being ultimately lured away from that goal by diplomatic sanctions, or being “bought off” by economic concessions?

  15. Aaron Says:

    Joe Mama,

    I hope I won’t be trying your patience by recommending, yet again, this piece by Fred Kaplan:

    http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0405.kaplan.html

    I’m not pushing this article because I think people will read it and say “Oh, I see I was wrong along.” I’m pushing it because it lays out a complete narrative of what happened, and because it so strongly informes the opinion of many liberals on this issue. When a smart liberal talks about North Korea, there’s a good chance he has this article in the back of his mind. In other words, it establishes a basis for conversation. If you have an article from a conservative perspective that serves the same function, I’d be happy to read it.

    And if you’ve already read the Kaplan piece, then never mind ;)

    All that said, it seems you understand the heart of the matter pretty well. The situations faced by Clinton in 1994 and then by Bush in late 2002 and early 2003 were remarlably similar. In both cases, North Korea had been found out to be violating at least the sporit and probably the letter of the Non-Prolferation Treaty. In both cases, they made threatening noises about restarting their nuclear weapons program, and in both cases they indicated their willingness to negotiate directly with the United States. In other words, they wanted to be bought off. Faced with this situation, both Presidents had roughly four options:

    1) Attack
    2) Threaten to attack
    3) Buy them off
    4) Do Nothing

    Clinton went with (2) and (3). We’ll never know if he would have been willing to do (1). Bush made a feeble attempt at (2), and then settled, basicly, for (4).

    Bush’s decision was made more difficult by two factors. First, North Korea’s overall nuclear capability was somewhat farther along due to their clandestine dealings with Pakistan. Exactly how much farther along they were is a point I’m not completely clear on. Second, because of Bush’s plans for war in Iraq, any threat of military response that wasn’t a complete bluff would involve fighting two wars simultaneously.

    So that was the choice. I think a reasonable case can be made (and you seem to be making it) that option (4) was better, or at least no worse, than option (3). I happen to think that’s wrong; that faced with no realistic alternative, buying time in North Korea was better than nothing. But I can understand the other point of view.

    ps. Apologies for any typos in this comment. It’s late, I’ve had some wine, and I don’t feel like proofreading.

  16. Charles Says:

    Why do you Leftist keep thinking Evil is always the fault of Good?

  17. Lojo Says:

    David -

    That is only reasonable if you believe that NK had stopped all its bomb making efforts under Bush I and Clinton and/or that the UN Inspectors (who were not performing any unannounced trips or undesignated sites) had been completely effective in shutting down their efforts.

    You never struck me as the gullible type, and to believe all that requires a massive amount of gullibility.

  18. Peter Evans Says:

    Hmm, good point Brendan. It was a bit of a sloppy arguement on my part. I guess that’ll learn me for generally only posting ultra-late at night or having just got back from a taxing day at work. I’ll come up with some counter-point (or grudging agreement) reasonably soon, I promise. I guess I just got peeved after going to another message board and encountering a knee-jerk, “OMG! Someone set NK up the bomb!11! All our city belong to targets!” as a reaction to the news.


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